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ANTITRUST- ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT-SECTION 2(f) BUYER
LIABILITY-The United States Supreme Court has held that, unless a
seller can be found liable for granting illegal discriminatory prices, a
buyer cannot be held liable for inducing or receiving such prices.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 99 S.
Ct. 925 (1979).
In 1965, the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company (A&P) decided to
switch from the sale of "brand label" milk to the sale of "private label"
milk' in order to reduce its costs for the product in the Chicago area.!
To implement this plan, A&P contacted its long-time supplier, the
Borden Company. After prolonged negotiations, Borden offered to sup-
ply A&P with milk and certain other dairy products under private
label at an estimated savings to A&P of $410,000 a year.' A&P,
however, was not satisfied with this offer and solicited offers from
other dairies. A competitor of Borden, Bowman Dairy, responded with
an offer that was substantially lower than Borden's.' After A&P in-
formed Borden of its competitor's lower bid and stated that a $50,000
improvement in Borden's original offer "would not be a drop in the
bucket,"' Borden submitted a new bid which doubled the estimated an-
nual savings to A&P from $410,000 to $820,000. Borden emphasized
that this new offer was made in order to meet its competitor's bid,
since A&P was one of Borden's largest customers.' A&P accepted
Borden's revised offer after concluding that their new bid was substan-
tially better than Bowman's offer.'
Based upon these facts, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or
Commission) filed a complaint against A&P 8 alleging that the chain
1. "Brand label" milk is sold under the brand name of the supplying dairy. The
"private label" milk was to be sold under the A&P label. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
FTC, 99 S. Ct. 925, 929 (1979).
2. Id. More than 200 A&P stores were in A&P's Chicago business sector, which in-
cluded portions of Illinois and Indiana. Id.
3. Id at 929. This offer was coupled with a proviso that A&P would accept limited
delivery service. Id.
4. The Bowman bid would have produced an estimated annual savings of $737,000,
i.e., an incremental savings of $327,000 over the first Borden bid. Id. at 929 n.2.
5. Id. at 929.
6. Id at 929-30. An additional factor leading to its decision to re-bid was Borden's
recent investment of more than five million dollars in a new facility in Illinois. The loss of
the A&P account would have resulted in the under-utilization of this new plant. Id at 929.
7. Id. at 930.
8. Section 5(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1976) em-
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store had violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act" by
misleading Borden during the negotiations." The charge was based
upon A&P's failure to inform Borden that its second bid was lower
than Bowman's bid." The complaint charged that the same conduct
also violated section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act" by knowingly in-
ducing or receiving price discriminations from Borden. 8 The Ad-
ministrative Law Judge found that A&P had violated both statutes as
charged by the regulatory agency."
On review, the FTC reversed the Administrative Law Judge's find-
ing 5 that A&P's conduct had violated section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 0 Noting that the charge raised the legal question of
disclosure requirements during contract negotiations, the Commission
ruled that A&P did not have an affirmative obligation to disclose to
Borden the terms of Bowman's bid during ongoing price negotiations,
since imposition of such a duty would be contrary to normal business
practices and the public interest.17 The Commission, however, upheld
the Administrative Law Judge's ruling that A&P had violated section
2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act since the company knew, or should
have known, that it was the beneficiary of unlawful price discrimina-
powers the Commission to file a complaint against any person, partnership or corporation
which it believes has been or is using any unfair method of competition.
9. Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976) pro-
vides in relevant part: "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful."
10. The complaint did not allege that Borden's second bid was induced by any
misrepresentation by A&P. The Commission, however, did argue that A&P had made a
false statement after receiving Borden's second bid, but this statement was regarded by
the Court as irrelevant since it did not induce the second bid. 99 S. Ct. at 934 n.15,
11. Id. at 927.
12. Section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act provides: "It shall be unlawful for any
person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or
receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section." 15 U.S.C. § 13(f)
(1976).
13. 99 S. Ct. at 930. The FTC's complaint also alleged that Borden and A&P had
violated § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act by combining to stabilize and maintain
the retail and wholesale prices of milk and other dairy products. The Administrative Law
Judge dismissed this charge on the ground that the FTC had failed to meet its burden of
proof. Id
14. Id.
15. An adjudicative proceeding is commenced when an affirmative vote is taken by
the Commission to issue a complaint. The case then proceeds to a hearing before an Ad-
ministrative Law Judge, whose decision may be appealed to the Commission. The Com-
mission's decision, in turn, may be reviewed in the court of appeals of the United States.
15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1976). See also 16 C.F.R. § 3 (1979).
16. 99 S. Ct. at 930.
17. Id
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tion. The Commission then rejected A&P's defenses that Borden's sec-
ond bid had been made to meet competition and was cost justified."
On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit upheld the Commission's decision." The court found that the Com-
mission had met its burden of proof under section 2(f) by showing that
A&P had knowingly induced or received illegal price discrimination
from Borden. ' The court of appeals rejected A&P's argument that,
based upon the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Automatic
Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 1 a buyer may rebut a prima facie case
of section 2(f) liability by raising either of two statutory defenses
available to sellers under sections 2(a) and (b) of the Robinson-Patman
Act.' As a result, the court denied A&P's assertion of both the cost
justification" and the meeting competition defenses. Instead, the court
18. Id.
19. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1977).
20. Id. at 980-81.
21. 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
22. 557 F.2d at 982. Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act provides in pertinent
part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the pur-
chases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities
are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory
thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under
the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent
differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufac-
ture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which
such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered ....
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act provides:
Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that
there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden
of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon
the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be
affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating
the discrimination: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent
a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or
the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in
good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities
furnished by a competitor.
15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976).
23. The court of appeals rejected A&P's cost justification defense upon finding that
A&P's cost studies were flawed in several respects, many of which were attributable to
the preparer's unfamiliarity with Borden's operations in the Chicago area. 557 F.2d at 984.
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held that in a section 2(f) case the meeting competition defense must
be viewed from the buyer's perspective, and since A&P knew that
Borden's bid was lower than Bowman's bid, A&P could not assert the
defense regardless of its potential availability to Borden.' The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari" and, upon review, reversed
the court of appeals."
Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority, acknowledged that the
Robinson-Patman Act was in part a response to the increased market
power and coercive practices of big buyers." However, Justice Stewart
stated that Congress was primarily concerned with the discriminatory
pricing practices of sellers when they drafted this remedial
legislation.' Noting that section 2(f) was a congressional afterthought,"
the Court examined the language of section 2(f) which proscribes a
buyer's receipt or inducement of price discrimination "prohibited by
this section."' 0 Although the phrase "this section" refers to the entire
section 2 of the Act, the court reasoned that since the only subsections
specifically referring to price discrimination were the seller liability
provisions of sections 2(a) and (b),81 there was a necessary linkage be-
tween seller liability and buyer liability. 2 It followed that a buyer, in
this case A&P, could not be held liable if a prima facie price
discrimination case could not be established against the seller or if the
seller could successfully assert an affirmative defense."
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied upon its decision in
Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC.' In Automatic Canteen,
Further, the court held that the Commission need not, in all cases, show as part of its
prima facie case that prices induced or received by the buyer were not cost justified. Id
at 985.
24. 557 F.2d at 982. A&P had argued that it could not be held liable for inducing or
receiving discriminatory prices unless Borden was liable for offering such prices.
25. 435 U.S. 922 (1978).
26. 99 S. Ct. 925, 935 (1979). Justice White concurred in part and dissented in part
and Justice Marshall dissented in part. Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision.
27. Id at 931.
28. Id
29. Id. at 931 n.8.
30. Section 2(f) of the Act limits buyer liability to conduct prohibited in general by §
2 of the Act. Sections 2(a) and (b) define price discrimination from the seller's standpoint
and provide for two affirmative defenses: meeting competition and cost justification.
Therefore, a seller whose conduct falls within the scope of prohibited price discrimination
but also within the scope of one or both of the affirmative defenses can escape liability.
See notes 12 & 22 supra.
31. See note 22 supra.
32. 99 S. Ct. at 931.
33. Id.
34. 346 U.S. 61 (1953). See also text accompanying notes 51-55 infra.
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the Court held that a buyer does not violate section 2(f) of the Act if
the prices he receives are either within one of the seller's statutory
defenses," or if the buyer receives prices without knowing that the
prices are indefensible from the seller's standpoint." The court in
Atlantic & Pacific rejected the FTC's argument that, under the rule of
Automatic Canteen, the defenses in sections 2(a) and (b) should be judged
from the buyer's point of view, and that A&P was therefore not entitled
to assert the meeting competition defense since the company knew
that the final Borden bid was lower than the Bowman bid.8' The Court
reasoned that by the plain language of section 2(f), Congress did not
provide for buyer liability if the seller has a valid defense. Therefore,
if the seller has a valid meeting competition defense, there is no pro-
hibited price discrimination for which the buyer is liable.
To justify its construction of the Robinson-Patman Act, the majority
considered the effects of a contrary holding that a buyer has a duty of
affirmative disclosure whenever it receives a lower bid from one of the
competing sellers. According to Justice Stewart, such a policy would
frustrate competitive bidding, lead to price uniformity and rigidity,
and conflict with the purposes of other antitrust legislation." Justice
Stewart emphasized that the FTC itself recognized that a duty of affirm-
ative disclosure would have an anticompetitive effect when it dismissed
the charge against A&P under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act." Based upon this reasoning, the Court held that a buyer who
had done no more than accept the lower of two prices competitively
offered would not violate section 2(f) provided the seller has a meeting
competition defense."
35. See note 22 and accompanying text supraL
36. 346 U.S. at 70-71. See 99 S. Ct. at 931-32.
37. Id. at 932.
38. The Court reasoned that any contrary rule would have the effect of judicially
amending the Act. This approach was previously rejected by the Court in FTC v.
Simplicity Pattern Co. 360 U.S. 55 (1959). In that case, Simplicity Pattern Co., a manufac-
turer of dress patterns, was charged with violating § 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 13(e) (1976), which forbids discrimination in services offered to purchasers.
Simplicity Pattern Co. defended the charge by contending that its acts had not injured
competition, and further, that its actions were cost justified. However, § 2(e) does not
restrict liability to instances involving competitive injury or lack of cost justification.
Stating that it "cannot supply what Congress has studiously omitted," the Court refused
to accept the pattern company's construction of the Robinson-Patman Act. 360 U.S. at 67.
39. 99 S. Ct. at 933. The Court also noted that a duty of affirmative disclosure might
be difficult to enforce since, if the competing bids were not based on identical quantities,
terms and conditions of sale, a buyer might not be able to determine when disclosure
would be required. Id at 933 n.14.
40. Id. at 933.
41. 99 S. Ct. at 934. Although the Court found that derivative liability was the cor-
rect standard to apply in determining § 2(f) liability, the Court specifically withheld judg-
1979
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After concluding that A&P could be held liable under section 2(f) only
if Borden had violated the Act, the majority analyzed the facts to
determine whether Borden, and therefore A&P, had a valid meeting
competition defense." Since Borden had a longstanding business rela-
tionship with A&P, the Court concluded that Borden was justified in
believing A&P's representations,' 8 and that the dairy had acted
reasonably and in good faith when it made its second bid." Accordingly,
the Court reversed the judgment against A&P. 5
Justice Marshall dissented from that portion of the majority opinion
which held that a buyer is not liable under section 2(f) of the Act
unless the seller has also violated the Act."' He contended that the
language of section 2(f) simply means that the elements of a prima
facie case against a buyer are the same as in a prima facie case against
a seller, and that the same statutory defenses are available to both
parties.'7 In Justice Marshall's view, a buyer could claim the meeting
competition defense if it had acted in good faith to induce the seller to
meet a competitor's price, regardless of whether the seller's price hap-
pened to beat that of his competitor. A buyer who induced the lower
bid by misrepresentation, however, could not escape Robinson-Patman
liability."
Section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act was first construed by the
United States Supreme Court in Automatic Canteen Co. of America v.
FTC.'9 For more than a quarter of a century, this remained the sole
ment on the application of its ruling with respect to a buyer who has lied to a seller about
bids from the seller's competitors. Id at 934 n.15.
42. Since both the FTC and the court of appeals held that a buyer could be liable
under § 2(f) even if the seller had a valid meeting competition defense, neither ad-
judicative body determined whether or not Borden had such a defense. 99 S. Ct. at 934.
43. See note 5 and accompanying text suprca
44. 99 S. Ct. at 934-35. The Court recently held that a seller did not have to be "ab-
solutely certain" that an offer of a price concession was necessary if the seller was at-
tempting to meet an equally low price offered by one of his competitors. Section 2(b) re-
quires only that a seller have a "good faith belief' that such a price concession is
necessary. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 453 (1978).
45. 99 S. Ct. at 935. Since the Court held that A&P was not liable under § 2(f) due to
its successful assertion of a § 2(b) defense of meeting competition, it did not examine
A&P's cost justification defense under § 2(a). 99 S. Ct. at 935 n.18. Justice White concur-
red with the majority in all aspects except the finding that Borden had a meeting com-
petition defense. Id. at 935 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He would
have remanded to the Commission to decide the questions of fact. Id. at 936 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. 99 S. Ct. at 936 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
47. Id.
48. Id at 937 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
49. 346 U.S. 61, 62 (1953).
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United States Supreme Court decision dealing with the relationship
between section 2(f) of the Act, which defines buyer liability, and the
bulk of the statute which emphasizes prohibited seller pricing
activity." Thus, when Atlantic & Pacific came before the Court, the
Court looked to Automatic Canteen for guidance. In Automatic Can-
teen," the Court addressed the question of whether proof of the
unavailability of a cost justification defense 2 was a necessary element
of a prima facie case under section 2(f) if a buyer was charged with
knowingly soliciting prices lower than those quoted to the buyer's com-
petitors." As a prerequisite to deciding that question, the Court ex-
amined the relationship between section 2(f) of the Act and the affirm-
ative defenses provided in other subsections. In its consideration of
this issue, the Automatic Canteen Court relied upon the legislative
history of the Robinson-Patman Act. The majority opinion noted that
section 2(f) was explained in Congress as a provision under which a
seller, by informing the buyer that a proposed discount was unlawful
under the Act, could discourage undue pressure from the buyer."
Given this congressional intention that section 2(f) was to be an offen-
50. See notes 12 & 22 and accompanying text supra.
51. Automatic Canteen Co., a large buyer of candy and other confectionary products,
was charged with violating § 2(f) of the Act for soliciting prices it knew were substantially
lower than prices quoted to other purchasers. It was shown that Automatic Canteen Co.
knew what the list prices to other buyers were and that it received, and in some instances
solicited, prices as much as 33 percent below the prices quoted other buyers. Id. at 67.
The FTC entered a cease and desist order, 46 F.T.C. 861 (1950), which was upheld by the
court of appeals. 194 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1952). The United States Supreme Court then
granted certiorari. 344 U.S. 809 (1952).
52. Cost justification is an affirmative defense provided sellers by section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act.
53. 346 U.S. at 63.
54. Id. at 73. The only congressional statement explaining § 2(f) of the Act and
its purposes consists of two brief paragraphs. Congressman Utterback, in presenting the
conference report to the House, briefly explained § 2(f) of the proposed legislation:
The closing paragraph of the Clayton Act amendment, for which section 1 of
this bill provides, makes equally liable the person who knowingly induces or
receives a discrimination in price prohibited by the amendment. This affords a
valuable support to the manufacturer in his efforts to abide by the intent and pur-
pose of the bill. It makes it easier for him to resist the demand for sacrificial price
cuts coming from mass-buyer customers, since it enables him to charge them with
knowledge of the illegality of the discount, and equal liability for it, by informing
them that it is in excess of any differential which his difference in cost would
justify as compared with his other customers.
This paragraph makes the buyer liable for knowingly inducing or receiving any
discrimination in price which is unlawful under the first paragraph of the amend-
ment ....
80 CONG. REC. 9419 (1936) (remarks of Rep. Utterback).
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sive weapon for sellers, the Automatic Canteen Court held that a
buyer is not liable under section 2(f) if the lower prices it induces are
within one of the seller's defenses or if the buyer does not know the
prices are not within one of those defenses.'
Although the Automatic Canteen majority cautioned that the
Robinson-Patman Act should be narrowly construed because of its im-
precise wording," the decision itself was ambiguous. Thus, Automatic
Canteen was subsequently interpreted to set two divergent standards
for imposing buyer liability. On one hand, the holding was construed as
a derivative liability rule, under which a buyer could not be liable
unless the seller was first found to have violated the Act." On the
other hand, the Automatic Canteen decision was read as allowing the
buyer the opportunity to raise the same affirmative defenses as the
seller could raise under sections 2(a) and (b) of the Act, but the
defenses were to be viewed from a buyer's perspective." Applying this
latter approach, a buyer could be liable under section 2(f) regardless of
the seller's liability."
Following Automatic Canteen, the lower federal courts that faced
the issue preferred the derivative liability standard. In Rutledge v.
Electric Hose and Rubber Co.,' the court held that, since the plaintiff
had failed to establish that a manufacturer violated section 2(a), it was
55. 346 U.S. at 74. The Automatic Canteen court concluded that "a buyer is not liable
under § 2(f) if the lower prices he induces are either within one of the seller's defenses
such as the cost justification or not known by him not to be within one of those defenses."
This means that the buyer must know that the seller cannot successfully assert one of his
affirmative defenses in order for buyer liability to attach. Id. The Court also held that
proof that a buyer knew the price he induced or received was lower than the price offered
to other buyers is not sufficient to shift the burden of introducing evidence to show cost
justification to the buyer. Id. at 81.
56. Id. at 65.
57. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Electric Hose and Rubber Co., 511 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1975);
Harbor Banana Distribs., Inc. v. FTC, 499 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1974). See also notes 60-71
and accompanying text infra.
58. This is essentially Justice Marshall's interpretation of Automatic Canteen 99 S.
Ct. at 936 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). See also Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC,
557 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1977); Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 871 (1971).
59. For example, if applied to the facts in Atlantic & Pacific, this interpretation
would result in § 2(f) liability for A&P, since it knew that Borden's bid would not fall
under the meeting competition defense because it was lower than that of Borden's com-
petitor. See 99 S. Ct. at 936, 938 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
60. 511 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1975). Rutledge was a private treble damage antitrust ac-
tion in which violations of §§ 2(a), (d), and (f), of the Act were alleged. The defendants
were also charged with violating § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Private treble
damage antitrust actions are provided for by § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
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logically impossible under the Automatic Canteen rule to find a section
2(f) violation." Similarly, in Harbor Banana Distributors, Inc. v. FTC,"2
a buyer was charged with inducing and receiving discriminatory prices
from its supplier." After finding that the supplier had granted the
variance to meet his competition, the court set aside the section 2(f)
charge against the buyer, stating that a prohibited discrimination is a
condition precedent to a finding of unlawful conduct under section
2(f)."
After the Automatic Canteen decision and before the court's con-
sideration of Atlantic & Pacific, only one lower court held that
derivative liability was not required by either Automatic Canteen or
the language of the Act. In Kroger Co. v. FTC,' Kroger, a large buyer,
was charged under section 2(f) with the inducement and receipt of
discriminatory prices prohibited by section 2(a) of the Act." In an at-
tempt to elicit a better bid, Kroger had informed the lowest-bidding
seller, Beatrice Food Company, that its bid was not the lowest that
Kroger had received. In reliance upon Kroger's statement, Beatrice
then submitted an even lower bid. 7 Beatrice was absolved of liability
under section 2(a) because its bid was a good faith attempt to meet
competition, which is an affirmative defense under section 2(b)."
However, the court found that Kroger was liable under section 2(f)
despite the discharge of Beatrice," thereby indicating that section 2(f)
61. 511 F.2d at 678. The portion of the court of appeals' opinion dealing with the
buyer liability issue is a brief affirmance of the district court's opinion. For the district
court's discussion of the issue, see Rutledge v. Electric Hose and Rubber Co., 327 F. Supp.
1267 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
62. 499 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1974).
63. Id at 396.
64. Id. at 399. The court cited Automatic Canteen as supportive of a derivative
liability standard. For an additional application of the derivative liability approach to § 2(f)
liability, see Aviation Specialties Inc. v. United Technologies, 568 F.2d 1186 (5th Cir.
1978). In that case a purchaser of aircraft parts charged that the manufacturer of those
parts had violated § 2(a) of the Act by selling the same parts to other purchasers at lower
prices, and that one of those purchasers had induced the alleged discriminatory prices in
violation of § 2(f) of the Act. Id. at 1189. The court stated that buyer liability depends
upon a showing of seller liability under § 2(a) of the Act; and since it found that the seller
had not violated that section, no buyer liability could attach. Id. at 1191. This holding was
based upon the finding that the defendant had not sold parts directly to the plaintiff but
had sold parts indirectly as part of a repair contract. Id Repair contracts are contracts
for services and not covered by § 2(a) of the Act. Id See note 22 supra.
65. 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
66. Id at 1373.
67. Id at 1375-76.
68. Id at 1373-74. See note 22 supra.
69. 438 F.2d at 1374.
1979
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liability was not necessarily derivative. In his opinion, Justice Clark"0
stated that, for the buyer to successfully assert a 2(b) defense, the
prices he induced must come within the defenses of that section, not
only from the seller's point of view, but also from that of the buyer.7
The interpretations of section 2 reflected in the Rutledge, Harbor
Banana and Kroger Co. decisions made it clear that the principles enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court in Automatic Canteen needed clarifica-
tion. The Court took the opportunity to clarify Automatic Canteen
through its decision in Atlantic & Pacific. By construing the language
of section 2(f) to require derivative liability, the Court applied the
statute in a manner that is consistent with the broader policies of the
antitrust laws. The Robinson-Patman Act, as the other antitrust laws,
was passed to ensure the survival of small businesses. The goal was to
prevent the development of monopoly-like structures by limiting the
power of large competitors. Since price discrimination might have an
anticompetitive effect by allowing strong buyers to receive unjusti-
fiably low prices, and thereby become even stronger, the Robinson-
Patman Act is appropriately read in the context of the other monopoly
laws.7" The Court's decision in Atlantic & Pacific is consistent with anti-
trust policy since a contrary decision would disallow buyer reliance on
the seller's defenses and require affirmative disclosure, a result which
would conflict with prior decisions of the United States Supreme Court
applying section 1 of the Sherman Act.7 In United States v. Container
70. Associate Justice Clark was a member of the United States Supreme Court ma-
jority in Automatic Canteen. At the time of the Kroger case, he had retired from his
United States Supreme Court seat and was sitting by designation on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
71. 438 F.2d at 1377. Justice Clark recognized, however, that ordinarily there is not a
violation of § 2(f) unless there is a violation of § 2(a), but stated this was a question that
need not be decided because of the "peculiar circumstances" at hand, i.e., Kroger's
misrepresentations to Beatrice. Id at 1374.
72. 99 S. Ct. at 933.
73. See C. EDWARDS, THE PRIqE DISCRIMINATION LAW 12 (1959).
74. The Atlantic & Pacific Court discussed the implications that a forced disclosure
policy would have upon the broader anti-trust policy. Justice Stewart reasoned that
unless a buyer could rely upon the seller's affirmative defenses, he would be precluded
from further bargaining if he had received competitive bids since any attempt to continue
bargaining might result in an even lower price and § 2(f) liability. The buyer's only option,
therefore, would be to either accept the original low bid or to reveal its terms and allow
another seller to match it. Since this process involved no real bargaining and would lead
to price uniformity, Justice Stewart rejected such an interpretation of the Robinson-
Patman Act. 99 S. Ct. at 933. The Automatic Canteen Court had previously warned
against broad interpretations of the Robinson-Patman Act which would lead to price
uniformity in open conflict with the purposes of other antitrust legislation. 346 U.S. at 63.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides in relevant part: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal."
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Corp. of America,"8 the defendant competitors exchanged information
concerning the most recent prices they were charged or quoted. Each
competitor complied with the requests for information in the expecta-
tion that they would be furnished reciprocal information when they
requested it." The Court found that such an exchange of price informa-
tion led to price matching by competitors in the same industry. Since
these practices precluded the setting of prices by free market forces,
the Court held that they were unlawful per se."8 Viewing the Container
ruling in terms of the Atlantic & Pacific controversy, placing a burden of
affirmative disclosure on a buyer would only have added a middleman to
the exchange of price information. If buyers were required either to
divulge to sellers specific information about competing bids or to ac-
cept artificially high prices, sellers could circumvent Container by ob-
taining pricing information from buyers. Thus, the Atlantic & Pacific
decision is sound given the legislative policy of advancing the free
operation of market forces.
An equally important aspect of the Atlantic & Pacific decision is the
Court's refusal to include the "lying buyer" within the derivative liability
rule."' In Automatic Canteen, the Court recognized that the language
of the Robinson-Patman Act did not lend itself to broad decisions but
instead demanded very specific analysis.' The Atlantic & Pacific Court
followed that logic in distinguishing Kroger Co. v. FTC, which involved a
buyer who made deliberate misrepresentations to a seller in order to in-
duce price concessions."' The Atlantic & Pacific majority's exclusion of
76. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
77. Id. at 335. The reciprocal nature of these requests was held sufficient to establish
the combination or conspiracy ingredient of a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id.
78. Id at 336-37. The defendant's conduct was held unlawful even though the practice
did not raise prices or even maintain them. The price trend was downward over the
period covered by the complaint. The practice merely had the effect of keeping declining
prices "within a fairly narrow ambit." Id.
79. 99 S. Ct. at 934 n.15.
80. The Automatic Canteen Court stated that "[slince precision of expression is not
an outstanding characteristic of the Robinson-Patman Act, exact formulation of the issue
before us is necessary to avoid inadvertent pronouncement on statutory language in one
context when the same language may require separate consideration in other settings."
346 U.S. at 65.
81. 438 F.2d at 1377. See also 99 S. Ct. at 931 n.6. A&P was not shown to have engaged
in such practices, however. Id at 934 n.15. A&P merely informed the high bidder, Borden,
that its bid was not the lowest, that it was more than $50,000 over the low bid, and gave
Borden a chance to decide if it wished to submit another bid. Id at 929. The Atlantic &
Pacific Court found that the grocery chain's conduct was nothing other than the type of
negotiation required in a competitive market system. The Court stated that "[in a com-
petitive market, uncertainty among sellers will cause them to compete for business by of-
fering buyers lower prices." Id. at 933.
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the "lying buyer" from the protection of the derivative liability stan-
dard is in keeping with its implicit ruling on the issue in United States
v. United States Gypsum Co.8' In that case, the defendants were charged
with a Sherman Act violation involving price verification practices
among competitors.83 The defendants asserted that the Robinson-
Patman Act required price discussions among competitors, since
buyers were frequently less than honest about the bids they had
received.u The Court rejected that argument, holding that the
Robinson-Patman Act did not require communication among com-
petitors. 6 However, the Court suggested that the solution to the "lying
buyer" problem might be the enforcement of section 2(f) of the
Robinson-Patman Act." The Court hypothesized that a sustained en-
forcement of section 2(f) would bolster the credibility of the buyers'
representations." This indicated that the Court would protect sellers
who had bid competitively in reliance upon the price representations of
buyers by subjecting a "lying buyer" to section 2(f) liability. This ap-
proach is logically consistent with the concern for the uninterrupted
operation of the competitive market since a "lying buyer" artificially
affects the open bargaining market by deliberately misleading bidders.
This being the case, a "lying buyer" cannot justifiably seek the shelter
of an antitrust policy which promotes free bidding.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC clarifies the previous ruling of
the Court in Automatic Canteen. The Atlantic & Pacific holding that a
buyer incurs no liability for accepting a bid which is lower than the bids
of other sellers, provided that the seller cannot be successfully pros-
ecuted under sections 2(a) and (b) of the Act, promotes the policy of the
antitrust laws by encouraging the free operation of the market place.
The freedom given to the buyer to negotiate lower prices, without fear
of 2(f) liability, will allow market forces to influence prices. Thus, the
Atlantic & Pacific decision represents a sound, narrow decision by the
United States Supreme Court which should put to rest any notions of
imposing an anticompetitive affirmative disclosure obligation on
negotiating buyers.
Michael J. Hennessy
82. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
83. Id. at 427-28.
84. Id- at 429.
85. Id- at 453-54.
86. Id. at 455 n.30.
87. 1d
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